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Otfried Hoffe
Political Justice - Outline of a philosophical theory
Ever since Antigone, in response to the call of the "unwritten 
divine commandments", disregarded King Kreon's prohibition and 
buried her brother, thereby risking her own life, the develop­
ment of Law and State in the Western world has been dependent 
on a normative-critical impulse. Against the arrogance of go­
vernment, which believes that it is allowed to raise arbitrary 
rules to the rank of valid laws, the idea of pre- and supra-po- 
sitive principles of Law and State is defended and every poli­
tical association is obliged to recognize these principles.
The totality of these principles was known for hundreds of 
years as Natural Law; in Ancient and Medieval times people 
also spoke of Divine Law and, in the Enlightenment, of the 
Law of Reason. Today these concepts are considered to be com­
promised and one prefers to speak of Political Justice. But in 
the eyes of many people this concept, too, has lost its status 
as Law. This is true, for example, of Luhmann and of liberal 
democratic theorists, according to whom political legitimation 
occurs through (democratic) procedure alone.
The following attempt to establish supra-positive principles 
of Law and State sketches (in the first part), the requirements 
of an appropriate theory of Justice and, in the second part, a 
constructive outline which fulfils these requirements.
I. Requirements of an appropriate Theory of Political Justice
An appropriate theory of Justice must, firstly, when conside­
red systematically, take serioQsly those objections which in 
the course of time have been raised against the establishment 
of supra-positive principles of Law and State, for example, 
in the form of the theory of Natural and Rational Law. Secondly, 
the theory must be considered in the context of the present 
discussion of theories and they must be analyzed in relation 
to the work of the most prominent contemporary political phi- 
lospher, John Rawls.
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2
The systematic objections to a theory of Justice come, above 
all, from two opposite directions, from philosophical Anarchism, 
or the utopia of the freedom from domination, even from govern­
ment on one side and a strong. Legal.Positivism and "Legitima­
tion through (democratic) procedure" on the other. There is , 
in addition, the reproach of an’ahistor ical ought.”
The justification of principles of Justice only makes sense if 
one assumes that there Jte a need for the practical reality to 
which the principles refer. The practical reality of political 
Justice consists of Law and State. Political Justice is based 
on the idea that there should be legal and political relations 
between human beings. However, this assumption is denied by 
philosophical Anarchism and by the utopia of freedom from do­
mination, even from government. For, according to them, each 
legal and political order, even an entirely just one, brings 
with it violations of the freedom of individuals and social 
groups. Legal and political relations therefore imply control 
and domination and, as such, are illegitimate. The goal is no
longer a just government but, rather: freedom from .government.*■* »
According to the basic intention of Legal Positivism, on the 
other hand, only the guaranteed Positive Law which has been 
authorized by the political Sovereign has the status of valid 
law. Whereas, according to philosophical Anarchism, the life- 
worldly hypothesis of Political Justice, the legal and politi­
cal order are illegitimate, accorf' strict Legal positi­
1. Systematic Requirements for a Theory of Justice
vism, the task of justification i sd with the legiti­
mation of positive legal and political conditions; normative 
critical criteria of^valuation and even principles of justice 
become superfluous.
One can label the antithesis of Anarchism and strict Legal Po­
sitivism the Antinomy of the Justification of Law and State: 
the thesis of Freedom from government is opposed to the Anti­
thesis of an arbitrary government.
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3
An appropriate theory of Justice recognizes the legitimate 
merit of both positions but also rejects their excessive claims 
and opens up a legal and political theory beyond the alternati­
ve: Anarchism or Legal Positivism. With Legal Positivism it re­
cognizes the necessity of a positive legal and political order 
and with Anarchism it denies the legitimacy of an arbitrary 
legal and political order. Both aspects taken together lead 
to the first basic proposition: to political Justice belong 
not only the legitimation but also the limitation of political 
domination. The theory of justice appropriates this proposition 
by showing, firstly, whŷ 'a legal and political order is needed 
at all and, secondly, according to which principles it may be 
considered valid and just.
Legal Positivism is not an inherently homogeneous tendency 
which only stands in^pposition to Natural and Rational Law 
and which simply denies the validity of supra-positive legal 
principles. Various kinds belong to Legal Positivism, which 
are linked to insights which an appropriate theory of Justice 
must also take into account.
Analytical Legal Positivism requires that a conceptual distinc­
tion be made, for good reasons, between Law and Morality. A 
theory of Political Justice follows on from this requirement 
in that it (second basic proposition), differentiates between 
personal and political 'justice and understands their object, 
Political Justice, as a normative idea of Law and State but 
not as a personal attitude or as moral virtue of individuals.
In Political Justice a moral claim is certainly made on the 
political world. But this claim is directed at the external 
coexistence of people, not at the personal attitudes of each 
citizen. Political Justice is the final principle of the nor­
mative justification of a community. On the other hand, per­
sonal justice is that moral attitude ~ which does not go 
beyond what one owes to the other person. Personal justice 
leaves the claims of Political Justice habitual and voluntary, 
not merely occasional and pursued out of a fear of punishment. 
Since the theory of Political Justice does not presuppose an 
idea of Justice as the basic disposition of a person, or jus­
tice as^ffr acknowledges that a moment of coercion
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4
belongs to every legal and political order, but certainly not 
of arbitrary coercion.
Thirdly, methodological Legal Positivism demands the avoidance 
of the is-ought fallacy. Since this demand is legitimate, the 
following theory of normative obligations of Political' Justice 
does not follow on from the natural attributes of things and 
of man, at least not from them alone. An appropriate theory of 
Political Justice also includes a genuinely.normative or, more 
precisely, an originally moral element. And according to Moore's 
theory of the Naturalistic Fallacy, this element is not finally 
defined in naturalistic concepts or in a descriptive metaphy­
sics of them.
An appropriate theory of Justice must fulfil a fourth condi­
tion. In addition to the Naturalistic Fallacy it must avoid 
the Normative Fallacy, to which Hegel's reproach, directed 
against Kant, of an ahistorical ought ("ungeschichtliches Sol- 
len") can be said to correspond. The normative fallacy consists 
in the attempt to derive specific or concrete obligations from 
normative consideration alone. In fact, normative considerations 
produce nothing more than the most general criteria of judge­
ment. To achieve obligations and to be able to orientate action, 
normative criteria must be combined with descriptive basic 
elements furthermore with the functional claims of politics,
society and economics and finally with conteirporary concrete 
situations,. The followingjtheory of Justice avoids, the^
normative fallacy by not regarding the formation of the hig­
hest principle of Justice as anything more than one step in 
the context of a theory of Justice. J aii together it distin­
guishes four stages. In the first stage, it must be establi­
shed why there is any need for Law and State at all; in the 
second stage, a highest principle of Political Justice must 
be defined; in the third stage this principle is specified in 
terms of secondary principles of justice, especially of human 
rights, according to the criteria of basic conditions of the 
socio-political world. In a fourth stage the problem is sketched 
of formulating such principles which I call the "Strate­
gies of Political Justice".
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5 I
No contribution to the theory of Justice has, in recent years, 
caused such an intense international debate as Rawls' Theory 
of Justice (cf.: Daniels and Hoffe 1977). Rawls looks for a 
counter-model to Utilitarianism, which holds a dominant posi­
tion in the English-speaking world, and according to which the 
highest goal of all action, including legal and political action, 
lies in the greatest well-being (happiness) of all concerned.
In this way Justice becomes a function of social welfare; the 
level of satisfaction e’rrjoyed by the whole of society and not 
of the individual takes precedence over personal freedom. A 
society of slavery or a police state which are so cleverly or­
ganized that although of course they seriously interfere with 
the range of personal freedom, they nevertheless guarantee a 
maximum collective and social utility, would not only be per­
mitted but even made morally obligatory. But then Rawls is 
rightly convinced that the idea of Justice requires
inviolable rights for every individual person, which one is not 
allowed to set aside even for the well-being of the whole of 
society (Rawls, § 1) .
Although Rawls rejects Utilitarianism, his theory of Justice 
reveals itself, on closer inspection, to be a "half-hearted" 
alternative to the utilitarian concept of political justice.
For firstly his list of primary social goods contains hetero­
geneous elements. Whilst the rights and liberties can be de­
fined independently of the human demand for happiness, and 
thus make possible a counter-model to Utilitarianism, income 
and wealth, and perhaps even opportunities and powers are ge­
neral means towards the fulfilment of the most diverse needs 
and interests. However, a universal fulfilment of needs and 
interests signifies happiness and here Rawls reverts back to 
Utilitar ianism.
Furthermore, Rawls attempts to prove the superiority of his 
idea of Justice as Fairness over Utilitarianism, with the help 
of decision Theory. Yet, a critical examination reveals that 
the d-ecision Theory assessment of one of Rawls' principles of 
Justice leads precisely to the maximum average utility and so
2. A counter-model to Rawls' theory of Justice
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6
to Utilitarianism and not to Rawls' Maximin rule; Rawls' own 
assessment legitimates the opposition. For beneath Rawls' veil 
of ignorance the decision in the original position, is not a 
decision under uncertainty but under risk. Its criterion of ra­
tionality is therefore: "Maximize the expected utility". Now, 
the expected utility is equivalent to the average utility so 
that the criterion of rationality reads: "Maximize the average 
utility", which corresponds exactly to Utilitarianism (see 
Hoffe 1984). Only in the first, but not in the second principle 
of justice, especially not in the Principle of Difference does 
Rawls succeed in formulating an alternative to Utilitarianism.
Thirdly, even the rights and liberties in Rawls' theory are
not free of a Utilitarian touch. Thus, they are considered as
the ger^ral conditions for the pursuit of desired plans of
life, and so they are, albeit indirectly, connected to human
happiness and are not defined independently of it. Finally, it
is an argument against Rawls that he makes no clear and reliable
distinction between Law (political Justice) and Ethics (personal Morality).
Since Rawls rightly looks for a counter-model to Utilitarianism, 
but only succeeds in formulating a "half-hearted" counter-model, 
in what follows, a theory of Justice will be sketched which re­
model does not see Political Justice in terms of needs, inte­
rests and* their fulfilment, happiness. It defines the legal 
and political idea exclusively in terms of freedom. The basic 
idea of Political Justice lies neither with Utilitarianism, in 
maximum happiness, nor with Rawls, in Fairness.lt consists of 
equal freedom or, more precisely, on an equal limitation and 
protection of the freedom of action. The first part of the fol­
lowing outline of a theory of Justice sees the basic problem 
of Law and State in the compatibility of freedom, the second 
part, the Justice of Law and State in equal freedom; in the 
third part this is specified to human rights and is finally 
made concrete in "Strategies of Political Justice".
presents a clear The opposite
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7
1. The circumstances of Political Justice or Why is there a 
need for Law and State?
There are basically two models for the justification of Law 
and State: the Cooperation Model, which was developed para- 
digmatically from Aristotle, and the Conflict Model, which 
can be traced back to Hobbes. But it is not until Kant that 
thè justification of Law and State is given that methodical 
elucidation, according .to which Law and State are needed be­
yond the alternative "Cooperation or Conflict", ss they are needed in 
order ̂ feman freedom may be made compatible and the compatibility of 
freedom may be guaranteed.
According to the famous definition physei politikon zoon (Poli­
tics , I 2) man is, for Aristotle, a living being who, on the 
grounds of biologically and psychologically based social im­
pulses, is oriented towards an association with his fellow 
men, and who can only lead a successful and happy life (eu 
zen), a humane existence, in the shared life of the structure 
and quality of the town-state, of the Polis. In the teleologi­
cal sense, that m«.n only finds his self-fulfilment in the 
institutionalized association of free and equal beings, of 
the Polis, man aims to lead his life in the Polis (see Hòffe 
1979, Ch. 1) .
»
Aristotle's thesis of the political nature of man is today 
undergoing a many-voiced rehabilitation. As research in an­
thropological, ethnological, psychological and other social 
sciences (with their extensive and differentiated material) 
confirms, man tends in various ways to seek an association 
with his fellow human beings. The key words here are: sexua­
lity, the helplessness of children and the formation of the 
personality (formation of the identity of the self), through 
diverse social relationships. They are called the faculty of 
knowledge and the ability to use language, the necessity of 
work and its facilitation through the division of labour. Man 
is dependent upon his fellow man even for the survival of the 
individual and of the species and also for a pleasant, inde­
pendent and just life.
II. The constructive outline of a theory of Political Justice
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8
Association is achieved in a multitude of social relationships 
(Primary institutions), such as marriage and the family, such 
as working relations, economic and protective associations.
the professions, duties and functions of primary institutions 
develop into the fullness of methodical know how. Above all, 
the state is that secondary institution in which the different 
primary institutions and professions are established through a 
differentiated system of political institutions (such as ma­
gistracies, national assemblies and courts of justice), which 
can thus evolve into a structured system of co-existence and 
cooperation, and which make possible for man a successful and 
happy, a good and just life. In short, according to the Aristo- 
telean type of argumentation, the state is necessary because 
man is a social being, who realizes his social nature in dif­
ferent primary relationships, which for their part, require a 
coordination as well as an adjustment of the idea of the Good 
and the Just.
religious civil wars of Early Modern times, however, show, with 
terrible clearness, that there are also tendencies in man which 
are hostile to society and the 'State. Moreover, it does not 
take a civil war to see that although man certainly does have 
strong social impulses, one cannot trust them. For man also 
has aggressive and destructive tendencies which conflict with 
his social nature. Whether it happens because of envy, jealou­
sy, vengefulness or pure malice, whether it is striving for 
power, recognition or possessions, whether it is out of an 
interest to impose one's own political or religious conviction 
- there are sufficient reasons and motives for the fact, that 
human beings turn against their fellow human beings. This sta­
te of affairs is especially true of modern man, who as he ad­
vances, dissociates himself from the bonds of a moral-political 
cohesive order, which had formerly supported him. Accordingly, 
modern political philosophy does not start from man's coopera­
tive nature but from his conflicting nature. For his fellow 
human beings, man is not merely a help and a complement, but
The state is the institution of second order, in which
According to the Aristotel
basis for the foundation of
al nature of man is a sufficient 
Law and State. The politico-
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9
also a competitor and a threat. Since the £tate as an institu­
tion, that is: as the lasting form of human association, should 
be real not only during the preponderance of the social, but 
also during the preponderance of the aggressive imposes, a 
thorough line of argumentation must take into account the 
"worst eventuality" and found the X^tate precisely on this even­
tuality. That Hobbes, above all, clearly recognized this state 
of affairs and, unperturbed by political and philosophical hosti­
lities, constructed his theory of the ^tate upon this insight, 
is a confirmation of his greatness.
On the other side, such a line of argumentation still cannot 
convince philosophical Anarchism. For it could wish to explain 
conflicts arising from certain aggressive and destructive ten­
dencies which for their part are due to specific economic and 
social marginal conditions, such as the institutions of priva­
te ownership and through a transformation of such historical 
conditions it could foretell the "decay" of legal and politi­
cal relations. The justification of Law and State must there­
fore be stated one step more radically.lt must be asked what Law 
and State ultimately consist of and whether they are necessary
for the association of human beings. It is to Kant we owe this more radical step.
Three elements are indispensable for the concept of law. Firstly, 
Law applies to freely-acting and responsible human beings. In 
contrast to Laws of Nature legal regulations are not complied 
with independently of the subjects concerned. Legal regula­
tions comprise a moment of request, of duty. Consequently, 
they only make sense to beings who understand such requests 
and can act in accordance with them, or against them. Legal 
regulations pre-suppose human beings who are free to act in 
one way or another and whose real doings can be attributed to 
them.
The responsibility or freedon of action alone creates no legal 
problems; lonely Robinson Crusoe does not yet know any law. 
Secondly, Law presupposes that there is more than one freely- 
acting human being. Law has to do with the co-existence of free­
doms of action.
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10
Since Law is concerned, on its fundamental plane, with the 
association of responsible subjects, needs and interests, which 
do not appear in action, when considered from the basic legal 
point of view, are at first, irrelevant. Law is not merely ne­
cessary because beings have needs and live together; for
animals also have needs and yet they do not live in legal asso­
ciations. Law is an indispensable institution only where the 
co-existence of free beings is at stake. In contrast to Utili­
tarianism, but also to Rawls' Principle of Difference, the legal 
association is, primarily, not an association of the needy, but 
a free association of responsible persons.
For the association of free individuals Law formulates orders, 
prohibitions and rules of procedure. An unrestricted freedom, 
the freedom to do and to leave whatever anyone considers to be 
just and good, is thereby limited. Law is, in its third element, 
a limitation of unrestricted freedom. The question of the ne­
cessity of Law and State therefore becomes the question: "Why 
does an association of free individuals make the limitation 
of the freedom of all of its members necessary?"
This question may be answered by the contrary, in a thought- 
experiment: "What would happen if there were no limitation of 
freedom and hence no Law and State?" In the philosophical tradi­
tion this thought-experiment is called the State of Nature and
finds a distinct form in particular representatives. Locke, for *
instance, posits specific natural rights to inviolable claims 
concerning life and physical integrity concerning freedom and 
property of the proceeds of one's own work. With such claims 
Locke rightly acknowledges unrenounceable human rights. Never­
theless these human rights are methodically falsely placed; 
they are not pre-given constituents of the State of Nature, but 
are to be justified solely by the thought-experiment of the State 
of Nature and of the Social Contract. Hobbes, on the other hand, 
defines man by the basic endeavour to his own preservation, by 
an infinite inclination for happiness and the restless desire 
for power after power. Besides he presupposes an equality of 
strength in the ability to kill and that of the weakness in being 
killed.
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11
With these elements, Hobbes succeeds in questioning Locke's 
problem, but he has still not recognized the nucleus of the 
theory of the State of Nature clearly enough. Kant is really 
the first to do this. According to him the State of Nature con­
sists in the purely rational construction of an association of 
free human beings in the complete absence of legal and politi­
cal relationships, anarchy in the literal sense of absence of 
coercion, in the State of Nature the unlimited, but wild free­
dom of all obtains; everybody can do whatever, to him, seems 
r ight and proper .
Now, the objection to such a state of affairs is not that it per­
haps brings with it fear and alarm: that is, in fact, precisely 
what happens in the case of natural disasters <The argument 
against the State of Nature is, rather, that it is a state of 
"externally lawless freedom" (Kant 1797, § 42). Nobody is obliged 
to refrain from encroaching upon the rights of others, just 
as he is not at all safe from the encroachments of others. In 
the State of Nature lawlessness leads to an inner contradiction. 
The hypothesis of an unlimited freedom of action, the "right to 
anything", reveals itself, on closer analysis, to be a right to 
nothing.
One has to agree with the representatives of social utopias of a 
free communication without constrain, on the point that human freedom 
is restricted by Law. However,one must oppose the view that 
such a restriction is superfluous, or even hosti£e to freedom.
In fact, a co-existence of unrestricted freedom of action is not 
merely not worth wishing for, but even, in the strictest sense, 
inconceivable. And this fact is due, not to any
supplementary argument, over which, for instance, liberalistic 
and Marxist philosophers are always in disagreement. Quite on 
the contrary, such controversies are reduced to mere waste paper. 
The impossibility is based neither on the assumption that man is, 
by his very nature, selfish, unsociable, obsessed by power or 
violent, nor on the assumption of a scarcity of the goods 
that man needs for the satisfaction of his needs and interests. 
The restriction of human freedom that occurs in Law is not legi- 
, timized by any empirical circumstances, whether of man or of
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external Tiature. Prior to those empirical circumstances, the 
restriction of freedom is based on freedom itself, that is, on 
the capacity to set and to pursue aims at one's own discretion, 
connected with a number of such freely-acting individuals. For 
without a simultaneous limitation and protection of freedom, 
without a state of Law and its public guarantee, the freedom of 
everyone is always in danger of being destroyed.
The decisive argument against philosophical Anarchism and in 
favour of Law and State is found in the thought-experiment of 
the State of Nature. This first part of a theory of political 
Justice, if it is looked at methodically, still includes no 
empirical considerations but instead it already includes a nor­
mative element. For even if no co-existence of freedom of action 
is conceivable without Law, the statement: "Law should be" is not 
based solely upon the fact that it is inconceivable. Rather, as 
an additional premise, it is assumed that a co-existence of free 
dom of action should exist. This normative premise, however, 
has not yet been proved here. Its justification follows in the 
next part.
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2. The Principle of Political Justice
After the question why there is a need for Law at all, one must 
deal with another one: according to the criteria of which 
principles can the Law be considered just? Since by Justice, 
we mean the highest, the moral criterion, we need, on the one 
hand, a criterion for the moral point of view which, on the 
other, is to be used in the legal problem of the mutual limita­
tion of freedom.
In modern and contemporary philosophy, the criterion for the 
moral point of view is highly controversial. In Thomas Hobbes 
we find self-interest or personal well-being as a criterion,. /Ain Utilitarlansim, the general well-being, in Kant, the cate­
gorical imperative, in the contemporary ethics of discourse, unre­
stricted discourse and in Rawls, the criterion of morality is 
put in the veil of ignorance.
To solve the controversy of the right criterion for the point 
of view in an unbiased and methodical way, we must first clarify 
the concept of morality and then, on the basis of this, seek 
to solve the controversy of the last criterion. The question 
of the principle of morality therefore begins with what I admit 
is only an intimated conceptual analysis.
Since, by the moral point of view we mean the highest claim 
that we can make of human practice it means something which is 
simply good or which is good without restriction, something that 
is not only good to or for something else, which, rather, is good 
in amd for itself; which is necessarily binding (hence: the 
categorical imperative). A practice is unrestricted or necessa­
rily binding only when it does not depend on the more or less 
arbitrary intentions of a person or of a type of person, but 
which, rather, is universally valid. When formulated in positive 
terms this means that the rigorous universalization of practice 
amounts to the moral point of view. To that extent, the competi­
tion which Ihinted at earlier, in philosophical ethics, is deci­
ded in favour of Kant. With the concept of the categorical impe­
rative Kant has rightly specified the character of the moral 
point of view, it denotes an unrestrictedly valid obligation.
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Beyond this, with the criterion of universalization he 
found the last criterion of the moral point of view. The 
highest criterion lies not m  the individual or/collective 
well-being; it lies in the rigorous universalization of the
underlying principles.---- :
l. Instead of a strict universali­
zation one can also speak of a universal capacity for consent 
and one can reconstruct this in the context of deci sion Theory 
as a 'Veil of Ignorance". To this extent the criteria of Kant, 
of the Ethics of Discourse and of Rawls can be regarded as 
equivalent. /A
From the combination of the principle of universalization with 
the legal task of forming the basic structure of an association 
of free beings, emerges the highest criterion for Law, the 
principle of Political Justice. Whilst, in the first part of 
the theory of Justice, the Utopia of freedom from government i is 
criticised, a strict Legal Positivism is rejected, in the 
second part, namely the idea that the Legislator (Lawgiver) 
may raise what is arbitrary to the rank of valid law. Thus, 
into the place, occupied by the freedom from domination, come 
not abitrary government, and the antinomy of the justification
of Law and State "Freedom from domination or arbitrary government" 
is dissolved and raised in the idea of a just government. Only 
the combination of fundamental legitimation and the equally funda­
mental limitation of domination which is contained in the 
concept of a just government corresponds to the task of the 
theory'of political Justice
Now a legal order suffices for the moral claim of rigorous univer­
salization only when it, firstly, lifts the mutual threat of 
human freedom of action and, secondly, when it lifts it in 
such a way that the freedom of action is guaranteed not only for 
the powerful, whereby power can be not only of a physical but 
also of a psychological, economic or intellectual kind. A 
rigorously universal removal of the mutual threat to freedom 
takes place where the unrestricted freedom of action of an 
individual is restricted to such an extent as is necessary
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to make possible the freedom of action of every other person.
The removal of the mutual threat of freedom applies wher® the 
restriction of the freedom of action follows universal principles, 
which are strictly equal for all persons. Political Justice 
is therefore the embodiment of these conditions under which 
the freedom of action of one individual can be reconciled 
with the freedom of action of every other person in accordance 
with strictly universal laws.
In more concise terms, I call the principle of the mutual 
restriction and protection of the freedom of action in 
accordar^g^v^th universal laws, the Principle of Equal Freedom. 
Its basic^rTs derived from Kant's Theory of Law, especially 
the introductory paragraphs A-C (cf. Hôffe 1983, ch.10).
With the help of the principle of equal freedom (objective) 
legal conditions are judged in terms of morality (legally prac­
tical reason) and not of positive validity or of public welfare.
It is the legal and political order which makes possible an 
association of free beings based on strictly universal laws that 
is, in a fundamental sense, just.
The principle of equal freedom establishes a highest subjective 
claim, namely the claim of every freely-acting responsible 
person to live with every other one under legal conditions 
which satisfy the principle of Political Justice.
From the principle of justice also follows the authorization 
of Law to usej^oercion. In the authorization to use coercion there 
is thus no irrational force, no morally illegitimate presumption 
of Positive Legal order, but rather, an indispensable element 
of every law that wants to be just. As paradoxical as it might 
at first appear: without the authorization to use coercion, a law, 
which is committed to equal freedom is inconceivable. Thus, 
once again, all social utopias that dispense with every form 
of government and hence also with the coercive character of law, 
must be rejected and, indeed, this must be done with the argu­
ment to which the Utopias themselves refer, with the argument 
of freedom. For, according to the principle of equal freedom
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every action is just which is compatible with the freedom of 
the others according to universal laws. Because such an action is 
just one also has the authorization to carry it out and every 
action which interferes with the authorization of another 
person is unjust. Since anyone who hinders someone else in his 
legitimate action is acting unjustly, coercion, which prevents 
illegitimate hindrance is a condition of the possibility of a 
legitimate free community and is therefore itself legitimate.
Nevertheless, with this fundamental justification of the authori­
zation to use coercion not every type and every degree of coercion 
is morally sanctioned. Coercion is right and proper only in so 
far as it serves the repulsion of injustice. Every degree of 
coercion which exceeds this is itself an injustice.
3. Human Rights as the secondary principles of Political Justice.
The principle of equal freedom requires that every legal order 
be organized according to universally valid principles. In such 
principles the last criterion of Political Justice is specified 
according to the different fundamental aspects of the socio­
political world. Such specific criteria or secondary principles 
are the universal conditions of the association of responsible 
human beings; they are the conditions of the mutual, external 
recognition of persons. Since it is a case of universal condi­
tions of human coexistence, they are due themselves to man,*when regarded from the point of view of political justice prior 
to and independently of any positive legislation. They are the­
refore also called human rights: innate, natural, inalienable 
and inviolable rights of every human being as a human being.
Human rights are claims which every individual has in respect 
of his fellow human beings and against political authorities. 
Since it is a case of claims which are due to every human being, 
as such, they belong to that which the legal order owes to man. 
Human rights are not at all based on voluntary action and on 
those actions based on socio-political love which go beyond 
what is owed. Quite on the contrary, they represent a vital 
element of a just legal and political order.
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Since human rights are secondary principles of political justice, 
no legal order is allowed to renounce their recognition. If the 
laws and the institutions of a political association guarantee 
inner as well as outer protection, even if they guarantee coor­
dination, efficiency and stability, and also guarantee econo­
mic well-being but at the same time are in conflict with human 
rights, they must, according to the criteria of human rights, 
be changed.
I include three groups.,„of rights in the term human rights: the 
personal rights of freedom, the rights of political participa­
tion and social and cultural rights. This tri-partite divi­
sion is directed against the frequent attempts to reduce the se­
condary principles of political justice to one of these groups. 
Such a reduction is contrary to the principle of equal freedom 
and is therefore illegitimate.
Whoever denies the personal rights to freedom takes away from
man the claim to a rigorously personal range of action which
must be kept free from every encroachment. Without the personal
rights to freedom neither survival nor a pleasant and humane >
life are possible^^/The first right to freedom proves this most
clearly, the right of the integrity of life and body. The legal
circumstances cannot be concerned for man to remain alive for
ever, never to become weak and finally die through illness,
accident or old age. But they can and should be concerned that *
life and body be protected from the encroachments of fellow hu-r 
man beings and of the State. The corresponding human right of 
the integrity of life and body makes a double requirement of 
the State: on the one hand, in respect of one's fellow man, the 
prohibition of murder, violence, physical mutilation and abuse, 
and also of psychological oppression; the corresponding defini­
tions of penal law thus have a significance in terms of human 
rights. The human right of the integrity of body and life also 
requires, in respect of the State itself,the protection from arbi­
trary arrest and punishment, thus constitutionally the oldest ex­
plicit human right (habeas corpus); in addition it also requires 
the prohibition of inhuman^punishment and of torture.
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As no community can function without a constitution,^ without laws and 
a government, the principle of equal freedom prohibits politi­
cal discrimination in the form of a politically inferior lower 
class and also political privileges in the form of a political­
ly superior upper class. Considered in positive terms, the prin­
ciple of equal freedom requires the free and equal participation 
of all citizens in the formulation of the constitution, of the 
formation of the laws and of the government. Since this equal 
consitutional freedom is the characteristic of democracy as a 
political system, one can emphatically say: democracy ranks as 
a human right. Considerfdvfrom the point of view of foreign po­
licy, equal political rights of participation require the right 
of self-determination of all peoples, so that this right, too, 
has the dignity of a human right.
Furthermore, a political community which takes the rights of 
freedom and participation seriously, must be concerned about 
generally valid empirical conditions, without which one cannot 
realize the rights of freedom and those of participation at all 
or only to a very slight extent. It is therefore part of the 
role of political justice to take over responsibility for the­
se framing conditions of an economic, social, cultural and po­
litical nature, which make the realization of the rights of 
freedom and those of participation impossible, which hinder 
them or excessively impede them. In contrast to critics of the 
idea of social human rights and of the idea of a Social welfare 
State, like Nozick, a political community also carries a com­
mon responsibility for the basic conditions under which pro­
fessional relations are specified and under which income, edu­
cation and social status are acquired, used and transfered; 
it carries a responsability for the basic conditions pertaining 
to problems of employment,' of old age, sickness and accident.
Of course, social rights may not be pursued at the expense of 
the rights of freedom and those of participation. For they are 
legitimate, from the point of view of human rights, as the con­
dition of their realization, but not as, the limitation of 
these rights. Social rights thereforejjustify a claim to care 
than they justify a claim to the making possible and the 
protection of personal and political freedom; they legitimate
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less the welfare state than a social state based on the prin­
ciples of freedom and participation.
4. Strategies of Political Justice
Also in their specification to human rights and in their real 
recognition as fundamental rights and basic political aims, hu­
man rights order a concrete course of action only tb a small degree 
Above all, social rights are general normative criteria, to 
which Law and State are pledged although they do not yet define 
or even precisely inculcate a concrete legal and political order 
or an individual political action. Thus human rights are prin­
ciples of political justice in the sense of fundamental norms. 
There are norms of a second order, according to whose criteria 
the corresponding socio-political relations should be observed 
and judged and really organised or further developed. Thus, po­
litical justice is only realized where one forms the legal-poli­
tical structures, the administration of justice and also the 
cultural reality and the economic and working world fully accor­
ding to the criteria of human rights.
The real formation of political relationships according to the 
criteria of human rights is only possible given the assumption 
of a knowledge of the conditions of life and a consideration of 
the corresponding legality of actions. Therefore, the 
task presents itself of reconciling human rights with the 
functional claims of politics, society and economy and with 
contemporary concrete situations, which can be very diverse in 
different countries and at different times. Concrete justice 
must be open to such differences; human rights as universally 
valid principles of Political Justice require no undifferentia­
ting and equal formation of legal-political relations in the 
whole world. Only through the historically concrete and conse­
quently also historically different provision and recognition 
of human rights is their realization accomplished.
The processes of public decision-making, which deal with these 
fundamental ethico-pragmatic tasks of contemporary politics may 
be labelled "Strategies of Political Justice". What matters 
is for them methodically to justify principles of Political
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Justice according to the functional requirements of a highly 
complex industrial society and its contemporary socio-histori- 
cal situation (see Hoffe 1975 and Hoffe 1979, Ch. 15). Only 
with the insight into this task is the theory of Political 
Justice completed.
>Translated by Anthony Zielonka
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